mirrored file at http://SaturnianCosmology.Org/ For complete access to all the files of this collection see http://SaturnianCosmology.org/search.php ========================================================== Roger Williams Wescott The assigned title of my oral presentation to the 1994 Kronia Symposium was "Velikovsky: The Big Picture." In it, I called attention to the etymological fact that Immanuel Velikovsky's surname is a patronymic derivative of the Russian adjective velik, "great." This Slavic word, in turn, comes, by way of Proto-Indo-European, from a reconstructed Nostratic root *wal-, "strong." Among the English derivatives of this root are three words that come to us through Latin (rather than through early Germanic): valor, value, and validity. This lexical material gives us even more reason-if more is needed- to esteem Velikovsky's scholarly valor and to assert both the spiritual value and the scientific validity of his work. During the early days of the United States' National Aeronautics and Space Administration, its Research Director, Tom Paine (a lineal descendant of the Revolutionary pamphleteer), declared his intention to hire only what he called "T-men." By this, he meant personnel who were simultaneously deep in one discipline and broad in a range of disciplines. Paine's criterion, I think, is applicable to experts in more than rocketry. One could extend it to all investigatory enterprises. And, doing so, one would find Velikovsky to epitomize the T-man ideal. As a specialist, he was in the forefront of psychiatric exploration, having been the first to postulate the electrical nature of epilepsy. Yet, as a generalist, he spanned the academic spectrum from physical science to global mythology. Turning again to etymology, I see significance in the fact that the literal meanings of the two Greek-derived words physicist and physician are the same; both mean "naturist," or one who studies nature in order to deal more effectively with it. Velikovsky was not only a scientist in the contemporary sense but also a natural philosopher in the Renaissance sense-naturally philosophical and philosophically nature-oriented. It is virtually a truism to say that Velikovsky was a cross-disciplinary scholar. But it may not be realized that he was cross-disciplinary in each of three somewhat different senses: First, he was multi-disciplinary. He worked in the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the the humanities. Second, he was inter-disciplinary. He worked productively in the interface between sciences. Since psychiatry is the interface between psychology and medicine, he had to be thoroughly conversant (as he was) with both fields in order to build serviceable bridges between them. And third, he was trans- disciplinary. That is, he developed an overarching perspective on the various disciplines in which he was unavoidably involved. This perspective, which transcended the topical viewpoints of the disciplines themselves, was the catastrophist paradigm, based on the assumption that ancient disruptions of a previously long-established order had transformed all aspects of human life on earth. Before proceeding to put catastrophism itself in perspective, let us briefly face a problem that no discussion of Velikovsky's thought can long avoid; and this is the fact that Velikovsky himself is widely regarded as a pseudo- scientist and his exposition of pre-Achaemenid history and evolution as unscientific. Why is this? The reason for his stigmatization, I believe, is scholarly parochialism-the growing tendency in most disciplines, but especially the more prestigious natural sciences, to identify the discipline itself with the most recent school of thought within the discipline. In the earth sciences, for example, geologists have tended since the 1960's to equate "scientific" geology with plate tectonics (which assumes gradual continental drift). Prior to the 1960's, however, the decades-old theory of continental drift was widely regarded as pseudo-science. To a student of comparative paradigmatics, the most that could be said about the scientific status of continental drift is that, having been intellectually unfashionable, it had become fashionable. The theory of continental drift, introduced by meteorologist Alfred Wegener before World War I, took a half century to become an accepted "scientific" paradigm. Velikovskian theory, introduced during and after World War II, remains under a half-century cloud. Yet Velikovskians may well be justified in expecting that, by the turn of the century, Velikovskian ideas will analogously attain scientific acceptance. In any case, much of what my fellow symposiasts and I are doing, both orally and in writing, is supplying what might be referred to as "footnotes to Velikovsky." By so doing, however, we are in no way demeaning ourselves or confessing to a lack of originality. For it has been repeatedly maintained that most of European philosophy since the Age of Alexander has consisted of "footnotes to Plato." Even if we include in the Velikovskian corpus not only Velikovsky's published writings but also his unpublished manuscripts, that corpus, large as it is, is only a fragment of the Velikovskiana that could and should yet flow from many pens. VELIKOVSKIANISM, CATASTROPHISM, AND QUANTALISM On the other hand, even among Europe's idealist philosophers, there are thinkers whose ideas are other than Plato's. Cartesian and Kantian concepts stretch the Platonic mold. By the same token, there are non-uniformitarian ways of thinking that either anticipate or go beyond those of Velikovsky. As William Mullen points out , there are varieties of catastrophism. The two types of catastrophism distinguished by Mullen are: palaeocatastrophism and caenocatastrophism . Palaeocatastrophism is the theory that, although our planet has undergone disruptions of global extent, none of these disruptions have occurred since the appearance of human beings. Caenocatastrophism is the theory that global disruptions have occurred within the memory of mankind. Palaeocatastrophism, though long out of favor, has made an undeniable come-back in recent years as a consequence of the Alvarez theory that a late Cretaceous asteroid strike brought about the extinction of the dinosaurs and related fauna . Caenocatastrophism, however, has yet to regain the acceptability that it enjoyed in the 18th century. To the temporal distinction between palaeocatastrophism and caenocatastrophism, I would like to add an etiological distinction between endocatastrophism and exocatastrophism. Endocatastrophism is the theory, set forth by Brendan Stannard , that global disruptions-at least those which have occurred within human memory-have been produced solely by processes, such as seismicity, internal to the earth itself. Exocatastrophism is the theory, dating back at least to the time Giordano Bruno, that whatever global disruptions have occurred were due exclusively to forces external to our planet . Of these four types of catastrophism, one at least has subtypes. For, theoretically at any rate, exocatastrophism could itself be any one of the following: 1. planetary 2. asteroidal 3. cometary 4. meteoric In practice, however, subplanetary bodies such as asteroids, comets, and meteors are difficult to distinguish. I will therefore take Victor Clube as representative of all three subtypes of non-planetary catastrophism . In terms of the preceding distinctions, some of which cross-cut one another, Velikovsky may be classified as a planetary caenocatastrophist. Recognizing, then, that catastrophism has many varieties, I am nonetheless dissatisfied with the term catastrophism as a blanket antonym to uniformitarianism (or uniformism, for short). For uniformism itself has at least two major conceptual components: gradualism and actualism. Gradualism is probably best represented by Charles Darwin's geological mentor Charles Lyell. Actualism is perhaps best represented by Lyell's older contemporary, the German geologist Leopold von Buch . Catastrophism, as I understand the term, should not be placed in opposition to uniformism generally but only to one of its two components-viz., actualism, which is the theory that the forces which shaped our planet and its inhabitants in the past are the same as those which are shaping it today. For the other component, gradualism, another antithesis should, I think, be postulated. The term which I prefer as the antonym to gradualism (the theory that major planetary changes occur so slowly as to be undetectable within a life-time) is saltationism. Saltationism was the term used by Thomas Huxley for evolution at a discontinuous rate, sometimes rapid and sometimes not . Although the term preferred by Stephen Gould for such evolution in spurts is punctuationism . I feel that the common rules of terminological priority require us to honor Huxley's earlier usage. The most dramatic manifestation of global catastrophe is probably biotic extinction, as exemplified by the relatively sudden disappearance of the Pleistocene megafanna, notably mammoths and mastodons. The most dramatic manifestation of its converse is, of course, speciation, as exemplified by the relatively sudden appearance of the Pleistocene genus Homo, to which our modern human species belongs . While it is true that Velikovsky sought to differentiate speciation from biotic catastrophe by referring to the former as "cataclysmic evolution," it seems to me that cataclysm is no less negative in connotation than catastrophe. For, in both words, the prefix cata- has the literal meaning "down." In discussing the creation of new species and genera, our need is for vocabulary that suggests rising rather than falling. I therefore prefer resuscitation and employment of Huxley's regrettably neglected term saltation to describe positive and creative evolutionary developments. Accordingly, I would depict the relations between the above terms as below: uniformism | quantalism ------------------- gradualism | saltationism | actualism | catastrophism Where gradualism emphasizes incremental change, saltationism emphasizes abrupt change. And, where actualism emphasizes constancy of condition, catastrophism emphasizes mutability of condition. Quantalism, obviously, subsumes saltationism and catastrophism in the same way that uniformism subsumes gradualism and actualism. But what is its terminological source? I employed it orally in a number of presentations to the Society for Historical Research and the Canadian Society for Interdisciplinary Studies to designate adherence to the hypothesis which some Velikovskians, in an effort to avoid the devolutionary aura of the phrase cataclysmic evolution, called "quantum evolution." Ultimately, the quantal concept derives from the Quantum Theory of Max Planck and other physicists, who referred to photons and comparable units of energy as being "quantized"- that is, occurring as discrete packets rather than as gradient emanations. Quantalism, however, is not conceptually restricted to the physical sciences. It plays a part in the life sciences, the social sciences, and what some continental European scholars call the "spiritual sciences" (humanities and religious studies). In zoology, the term species itself is quantal, in the sense that, genetically-and hence operationally-speaking, every animal can be unambiguously assigned to a species and no animal falls between species. In this sense, species contrast with subspecies, such as human races or canine breeds, which can and do both intergrade and interbreed. Analogously, in linguistics, the subdiscipline of phonology makes extensive use of what is called "the quantum principle," in accordance with which at some levels speech-sounds are overlapping and hence non-quantal, whereas at other levels they are distinctive and hence quantal. (The technical term used for intergrading and non-quantal speech-sounds is allophones. The corresponding term for contrastive and quantal speech-sounds is phonemes.) CATASTROPHISM AND ANIMAL BEHAVIOR Velikovsky's intellectual ecumenism was well exemplified, I believe, by the fact that he offered behavioral as well as physical evidence for ancient catastrophes. In Mankind in Amnesia, he detailed the psychopathology involved in mankind's self-repressive denial of collective trauma . To the best of my knowledge, however, neither he nor most of his ideological heirs have given any attention to those pathologies of animal behavior which may reasonably be attributed to these same global disruptions. If only briefly, I should like to do so now. My assumption is that the catastrophes which led to distortions in human behavior had a similar effect on animal behavior and that the more animals resembled us, the greater that effect was. Consequently, I shall deal only with two groups of animals-those which are genealogically closest to us (the mammals, especially placental mammals) and those which are typologically closest to us (the insects, especially social insects.) The behavioral disturbances which will be covered below are: 1. violence 2. coercion 3. exclusionary behavior 4. overcompensatory behavior 5. endopathy (internal disturbance) Of all forms of animal violence, the most conspicuous is predation, which appears in many animal groups. If it is objected that predation is not only natural but necessary for carnivores, the answer, of course, is that only meat-eating is necessary. Scavenging alone provides adequate edible flesh for small populations of carnivores. (And, compared to herbivorous populations, carnivorous populations always are small.) Ironically, it is now recognized by paleontologists that the giant carnivore Tyrannosaurus rex, which used to be taken as the archetype of the monstrously ferocious predator, had forelimbs so small and spindly that it could not have used them to seize prey. Instead, it probably employed its long teeth alone to slice out large chunks from big corpses. One form of violence which comes closer than does ordinary predation to being self-destructive is cannibalism. Not surprisingly, it is common among predators, such as lions, which often kill and eat alien cubs. But it turns out also that omnivores as closely related to us as chimpanzees occasionally kill and eat members of troops to which they are hostile. Such behavior should probably be referred to as ambushing or raiding rather than as warfare. The term war, however, is commonly used by entomologists to describe mass assaults by the members of one ant-nest on the members of another. Sexual coercion is not as common among animals as laymen tend to assume. But the manner in which our near kinsmen, male orang-utans, obtain sexual access to females is actually described as rape by some primatologists. The only non-human animals that enslave members of related species are ants. Ants also domesticate other insects, such as aphids, which are often referred to as "ant-cows," since herder ants relish the sweet nectar which they exude. The commonest form of exclusionary behavior is the xenophobic aversion to members of rival communities that is exhibited by most social mammals and insects. A dramatically audible illustration of it is provided by Latin American howler monkeys, whose bellowed "keep out!" warnings may be heard for miles. Territorialism is, if anything, even commoner than xenophobia. For solitary animals are just as jealously possessive of their individual territories as social animals are of their collective territories. It is difficult to think of any mammal or insect that is not, at least in its adult form, territorial in one or the other of these two senses. Among placental mammals, male monopolization of accessible females is so common as not to require illustration. Those species, like the great apes of Africa, which do not prevent sexual access by fellow males, are exceptional. Hierarchy (partially equivalent to what, among birds, is called "peck order") is typical of placental mammals and social insects. But it takes different forms in the two groups. Among mammals, it is usually a system of ranking individuals, which superordinates sustain by continuous intimidation of subordinates. Among insects, it is a ranking of groups rather than of individuals. This group ranking, moreover, is physiologically and anatomically rather than psychosocially determined. When anatomically determined, it separates reproductives from workers and workers from soldiers, as among termites. But, when physiologically determined, it separates builders from nurses and nurses from foragers, as among age-graded honey-bees. A form of exclusionary behavior that is rarely thought of in negative terms is familialism. Quite apart from the recent politicization of "family values," most of us have traditionally thought of family feeling in terms of emotional warmth and nurturant behavior. Those few scholars who have spoken disparagingly of the family, as did psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich when he coined the phrase "compulsive familitis," are often dismissed as cynics. Yet the family, whether institutionalized, as among human beings, or merely habitualized, as among animals, not only focuses love on relatives (surely a positive effect) but also, and perhaps more often, withdraws love from non- -relatives (at least potentially a negative effect), frequently replacing it with xenophobia, or hostility to outsiders. Surprisingly, perhaps, family attachments seem to be both stronger and more extensive among social insects than among the higher mammals. Among most mammals, the family is restricted in scope, consisting only of a mother and her offspring. And usually it is restricted in duration as well, ending, at least in behavioral terms, after the weaning of the young. Among social insects, on the other hand, familial behavior is complex and life-long. Not only do mothers protect and feed offspring till pupation, but adult daughters reciprocate, tending and feeding mothers when the latter become virtual egg-laying machines. Moreover, older daughters also take over the tasks of feeding and tending their younger sisters until these sisters too pupate. So it is quite appropriate to speak of maternal, filial, and sororal devotion among such hymenopterans as wasps, bees, and ants. Among termites, furthermore, this devotion extends equally to males. Male reproductives remain with their mates, and male workers and soldiers exhibit fraternal solicitude equal to the sororal solicitude of their female siblings. By using the term "colonies" to refer to the habitations of most hymenopteran and all isopteran species, we misleadingly suggest that these are communities-that is, groups of cooperating families (such as primate troops or ungulate herds). In fact, however, nearly all of them are families, exhibiting just as much hostility toward other families within their species as toward insects of other species. When, as in the case of some ant-nest complexes, the habitation is a multi-family community, this community exhibits the same in-group attachment and out-group aversion as do the families of non-communal insects. In concluding this consideration of animal familiality, the point which I wish to make is that, overall, what may be most significant about families is not the small number of individuals that each includes but the large number that it excludes. No less important than exclusionary behavior is overcompensatory behavior. Exclusionary behavior seems to be an implicit (non-verbal and probably unconscious) response to a feeling that the environment is, or has at least become, so penurious that its resources cannot be relied on to supply the needs of all; with the result that one must, as far as possible, exclude from those resources all individuals but oneself or all groups but one's own. Overcompensatory behavior seems to be an equally implicit response to an even more distressing sense that the environment threatens extinction to oneself and one's progeny, actual or potential. The most salient response to the felt threat of extinction is increased reproduction, resulting in overpopulation. So many animal species reproduce in a geometrically progressive manner that biodemographers frequently take it for granted that each would replace most competing species were it not for countervailing forces that limit or reduce its rate of self-replacement. Be that as it may, we know that some mammals, most notably rodents, periodically experience population surges so extreme that some species, including lemmings and "mad migrant" mice, undergo seemingly suicidal mass expansions into wholly inhospitable areas, such as open waters. The migrations of nomadic insects, such as army ants, are not self-destructive in the same way as those of overcrowded rodents. But it can be argued that the local populations of some sedentary insects, ants as well as termites, numbering in the tens of millions, are so dense as to verge on the pathological. Pathology, of course, can be psychological as well as social-that is, internal to the individual as well as external, occurring between individuals within a group. Among mammals, one of the conditions most widely accepted as being pathological is musth among elephants. Musth is a state of agitation, commonest among mature adult males in the rutting season, in which some become "rogue elephants," attacking other elephants, trees, houses, and even locomotives. All felines, but especially smaller cat species, exhibit a jumpiness out of keeping with their prowess as predators. This hypersensitivity is well expressed by the common locution "nervous as a cat." Canines-not only dogs but also wolves, coyotes, and jackals-all exhibit a behavioral trait whose pathology is debatable. This trait is conscientiousness, definable as a tendency to reproach or punish oneself for disobedience or disloyalty to authority. Among canines, the authority involved is that of the hunting pack or the pack-leader (who, for dogs, is usually a human master). It characteristically takes the form of cringing or otherwise exhibiting a "hang-dog" attitude. The chief reason why some comparative psychologists deny the pathology of this behavior is that human conscience is widely regarded as an asset and human loyalty as a virtue. But I concur with Arthur Koestler and others in seeing voluntary self- subordination to group authority as the indispensable enabling factor in the genesis of wars and other forms of punitive destruction. One of the most distinctive traits of our anxious and trammatized species is deceptiveness, which, not surprisingly, is most commonly expressed as prevarication. Since other species do not verbalize, their deceptions naturally take other forms. Although mammals exhibit no close analog of the "broken-wing ploy" by which birds divert potential predators from their nests and fledglings, they can and do deceive in other ways. Our nearest genetic kinsmen, the chimpanzees for example, learn early in life to suppress their inherent tendency to alert their fellows to unexpectedly discovered food sources. Even when not hungry, they remain inexpressive in the presence of such finds if potential competitors are nearby, giving in to the expression of excitement only when they feel sure of being unobserved. Before concluding this rather melancholy catalog of animal pathologies, putative or actual, we should probably palliate it by noting what appears to be an ecological exception. Aquatic mammals, particularly otters, seals, and dolphins, seem far more good-natured and high-spirited than their terrestrial congeners, some of whom, like bears, buffaloes, and rhinoceroses, strike us as surly and ill-tempered. Author Herman Melville, who spent years at sea, was perennially delighted by what he called "the godly gamesomeness" of porpoises. And he observed that some of the larger whales, like hump-backs, were, despite their bulk, amusingly playful creatures. The best explanation for the sportive good humor of aquatic mammals may well be that water affords them a buoyancy that their land-lubber cousins lack. The catastrophist consensus suggests that pre-catastrophic gravity was appreciably less than post-catastrophic gravity. If this is so, we may reasonably infer that the levity, both literal and behavioral, which all creatures enjoyed before "the fall" no longer sustained land mammals. Aquatic mammals, however, may be presumed to have retained that levity-or at least to have lost far less of it than those of their congeners who found themselves suddenly weighed down. LINGUISTICS AND QUANTALISM Since the nineteenth century, it has been recognized that historical linguistics and evolutionary theory present striking parallels. Foremost among these is the fact that both fields of study employ the dendrogram, or family tree, model of diachronic development: in historical linguistics, the language family is the trunk and languages are its branches; in evolutionary theory, the genus is the trunk and species are its branches. Nevertheless, linguistic contributions to evolutionary theory have been constricted by consistent, if usually inexplicit, reliance on uniformist assumptions. The result is that many etymological, semantic, and stylistic sources of evidence for early human experience are unjustifiably neglected. Foremost among these sources of evidence is the occurrence, among many ancient and reconstructed languages, of large numbers of "coincidental" homophones. (Homophones are forms, like English be and bee, which sound the same but have divergent, and presumably unrelated, meanings.) In no few of these cases, the homophony is coincidental only in uniformist terms. In quantalist terms, the homophony may be indicative of an aboriginal synonymy. Examples of such potential synonymy follow: 1. Greek okeanós, "ocean," looks as though its root is the same as that of Greek okús, "swift." But, because oceans move slowly compared with rivers, it has long been assumed that the root resemblance is accidental. The ancient Greeks, however, said that okeanós circled the earth. If we assume that okeanós originally designated not a body of salt-water but a circum- planetary ring like Saturn's, the contradiction disappears. One would expect a stratospheric ring around our planet, provided that its motion was not geosynchronous, to seem swift-moving when viewed from earth's surface. 2. Sanskrit asman can mean either "heaven" or "stone." Most etymologists have assumed that they were here dealing with two unconnected words. But, if we may assume a protohistoric frequency of meteorite falls that greatly exceeded that of our day, the disconnection vanishes. The sky could be thought of as a store-house of stones and stones as missiles from the sky. 3. Latin caelum can mean either "heaven" or "chisel." As in the case of the Sanskrit diseme above, these two Latin meanings have been regarded as lexically distinct. Celestial missiles, however, can cut or reshape whatever they strike and, in so doing, give the impression of being hand-tools of the gods. 4. Proto-Indo-European *petro- could mean either "that which flies" (and hence "bird," "wing," or "feather") or "rock." As in the two preceding cases, these meanings have been consensually dissociated. Yet, again as above, they can be re-associated by noting the likelihood that stony bolides were frequently observed to fly or fall through the air before striking the earth. 5. In a different semantic context, Proto-Indo-European *leugh-could mean either "take an oath" or "tell lies." These apparent antonyms have generally been regarded as unrelated to one another. But, from the view-point of a pre- lapsarian ethos, whether residual or resuscitated, the two might be considered inseparable, since oaths are imposed only on those who are thought likely to lie. (And, in a post-catastrophic world, all members of "fallen humanity" are thought to be at least capable of deceiving one another, if not indeed strongly inclined to do so.) Homophony aside, many traditional etymologies are susceptible to reinterpretation from a quantalistic perspective. One such word is the English noun planet, derived from a Greek verb meaning "wander." The conventional interpretation of this nomenclature is that planets, which visibly orbit, change their celestial positions in a way in which the so- called fixed stars seem not to. But the Greek verb planáo did not only mean "wander." It also meant "stray," "err," and even "deceive." To a quantalist, this suggests that the pre-Greeks perceived the planets as deviating from their accustomed orbits and thereby confusing observers about the time of day or the season of the year. The Greek epithet for Hermes (known in Latin as Mercury) was trismégistos, literally "thrice greatest." Most Classicists have taken this superlative nominal to be an instance of poetic hyperbole analogous to Shakespeare's "most unkindest cut" and have semantically normalized its translation into English as "thrice great." Many, furthermore, have treated the adverb trís as a conventional numerical, in the tradition of (pre-Christian) religious trinitarianism, with the result that the entire compound, shorn of verbal extravagance, comes to mean little more than "very great." Quantalistically speaking, however, this epithet may be taken at face value to indicate that, on three separate prehistoric occasions, the planet Mercury approached the earth so closely as to appear to be the largest object in the sky. During the 3rd century of our era, the leading deity of the Roman Empire was Sol Invictus, "the unconquered sun." Its cult was promoted by the Syrian- born emperor Elagabalus, whose Semitic name meant "the god of the pinnacle." The common assumption about this theonymic phrase is that it could be loosely equated with "the invincible sun." But, as a quantalist, I am inclined rather to take it literally, in which case there exists an implied contrast with the phrase Sol Victus, "the conquered sun." Although this latter phrase does not occur in Roman literature, the phrase Sol Indigetes is found, referring to an older sun-god. One possible translation for the word indigites is "driven thence." This semantic polarity leaves open the possibility (which Saturnians may regard as a probability) that the unconquered sun is the star Sol itself, whereas the banished sun is the smaller star or larger planet of which the earth was once a satellite. The Gaulish noun Druid- (morphemically construed as dru-wid-), when literally translated, means "tree-seer." It is usually assumed that this title for pre-Christian Celtic priests is merely a synonym for "forest magician." If, however, we rely on catastrophist mythology to help us reconstruct a vanished solar system, we can re-interpret the compound to mean someone who visualizes the tree-that is, the Cosmic Tree or World-Axis-and thereby, at least spiritually, reincarnates primal humanity. The English adjective Lenten (from which the noun Lent is a back-formation) comes from the Old English noun lengten, meaning "spring-time fast." Etymologically, the modifier leng- means "long," and the bound form -ten means "day." To me, it seems evasive not to identify this "long day" with the pre-Christian disturbance of earth's rotation referred to in ancient literature and theorized about in recent catastrophist publications. To be sure, nearly all of the preceding linguistic materials has been drawn from Indo-European languages. This fact might understandably lead to the suspicion that our investigation has been skewed by ethnocentrism, especially if it can shown that early Indo-European peoples were more inclined than others to exaggerate or dramatize natural disasters. As evidence that there is little reason for this suspicion, I shall select material from two other language-families: the Semitic family of south-west Asia and the Kwa family of west Africa. The name Eve, for the Biblical mother of mankind, had, in Classical Hebrew, the form hawwah, meaning "one living." This name has generally been interpreted as indicating that Eve was the source of all human life. Following the quantalist principle, however, that all mythic creations should be construed as re-creations or re-directions, I prefer to interpret the name of Eve as having meant "one (of the only pair still) living (in their locale)"-an onomastic comment on the astonishing good fortune that anyone at all survived a recent catastrophe. In Bini, the language of the former Empire of Benin in southern Nigeria, the name for the planet Venus is Agukisinmwin'ogie, which means "the Moon's rival." Hearing this, most Europeans have apparently interpreted it as a hyperbolic way of noting that Venus looks brighter than the other planets. But, in quantalist terms, the name can be taken as evidence that, at an earlier time, Venus loomed as large as the Moon in our sky. A RECONSTRUCTED VOCABULARY OF VIOLENCE Thus far, we have cited reconstructed forms only from Proto-Indo-European, the postulated parent language of most of the extant languages of Europe, Iran, and India. Historical linguists have been citing versions of these forms for a century and a half. But historical linguists do not stop with Proto-Indo- -European. For the past three decades, they have been reconstructing forms from Proto-Nostratic, a still older unwritten language held to be ancestral not only to Indo-European but also to most other European languages. Of the 477 reconstructible Proto-Nostratic forms cited by Allan Bomhard in his "Lexical Parallels between Proto-Indo-European and Other Languages," 24%, by my count, are glossed by such meanings as "damage, injure, twist, burn, crush, hurl" and the like. Furthermore, large though this vocabulary of violence seems, I suspect that it is an underestimate. For many of the verbs with the seemingly non-violent meanings "shine," "blow," and the like may actually have been muted in later times. It is quite possible that, in the immediate post-catastrophic period, some of the forms denoting brightness may have referred to light that was dazzling, if not literally blinding; and some of those denoting wind may have referred to hurricanes or even more violent atmospheric disturbances. LAUDATORY METAPHORS OF VIOLENCE Those who accept the probability of global catastrophe in early times often conceive of its psychological effects in terms of a complete Nietzschean transvaluation of positive into negative feelings. They are inclined to think of panic replacing assurance, hatred replacing love, and misery replacing joy. Yet the characteristic emotional tone of post-lapsarian humanity, I believe, has been-at least in historical times-not one of unmixed aversiveness but one of ambivalence: feeling partially attracted by what repels us and partially repelled by what attracts us. Nowhere is this mixture of strongly positive and strongly negative emotions better expressed, I think, than in contemporary American English slang. Here we encounter metaphors not only physical violence but also of terror, madness, and general loss of control. Examples follow: category: violence example #1: "a smash hit" literal meaning: a shattering blow effective meaning: a theatrical success example #2: "get stoned" literal meaning: be injured by flying rocks effective meaning: get happily drunk category: terror example #1: "terrific" literal meaning: terrifying effective meaning: extremely good example #2: "frightfully smart" literal meaning: terrifyingly painful effective meaning: unusually intelligent category: madness example #1: "madly in love" literal meaning: psychotically infatuated effective meaning: maximally romantic example #2: "all the rage" literal meaning: total fury effective meaning: most popular category: loss of control example #1: "fall for her" literal meaning: lose one's footing with regard to her effective meaning: love her uncritically example #2: "give him a tumble" literal meaning: make him fall effective meaning: lead him on romantically Equivalent expressions may be encountered in French, German, and other modern languages. PSYCHOANALYSIS, VELIKOVSKIAN AND REICHIAN Both Immanuel Velikovsky and Wilhelm Reich were East European Jewish physicians who became psychoanalysts and sought to apply Freudian concepts to the investigation not only of individual pathology but also of collective pathology. The major difference between them was that Velikovsky adhered to the consensual psychoanalytic view (Jungian as well as Freudian) that human problems are primarily mental in nature, whether the analyst confronts emotional conflict within individuals or dissociation of memory in our species as a whole. Reich, by contrast, came increasingly to regard the proper subject-matter of psychology as being not ideas in the mind but energies in the body. For him, psychological health was inseparable from physiological health. Within the healthy individual, according to Reich, energy flows freely, and the musculature, while toned, is relaxed. The unhealthy individual, however, exhibits what may be called, in psychological terms, character armor and, in physiological terms, muscular armor. This "armor" is actually chronic bodily hypertension, attributable to a collectively inherited state of apprehension. The apprehension, Reich held, can be dispelled only by discharge of the bound muscular energy which both results from it and, in turn, re-generates it. Reich termed such discharge the orgasm reflex. He distinguished this reflex both from the ejaculatory reflex, which can discharge reproductive material without de-tensioning the musculature, and from the climactic reflex, which can relax the genital organs without relaxing the rest of the body. Only the orgasm reflex, he held, purges the entire body of hypertension and fully revitalizes the individual. Being, like Freud, basically Victorian with regard to sensuality, Velikovsky could never accept the Reichian vision of healthy functioning, which seemed to him more orgiastic than orgastic and hence subversive of social order. Reich, on the other hand, was open to catastrophic hypotheses regarding the genesis of muscular armoring. Unfortunately for him, however, Velikovsky's Worlds in Collision did not appear till the 1950's, when he was beginning to be subject to professional attacks from more orthodox psychiatrists and increasingly scrutinized by governmental authorities. His situation no longer afforded him the opportunity for leisurely investigation that he would earlier have welcomed. My own feeling is that Velikovskian theory and Reichian theory are naturally complementary. The former provides an explanation of humanity's self- deprivatory behavior, while the latter gives us a picture of human physical and emotional fulfillment as it may have existed before the catastrophes and might exist again. THE GOLDEN AGE Just as Reichian theory supplements Velikovskian theory by filling in some of its gaps, mythological material may supplement Reichian theory in an analogous manner. For myth strongly suggests that there was a fundamental difference between pre-lapsarian and post-lapsarian consciousness. In historic times, consciousness has, apart from dubious examples of extra- sensory perception, been exclusively individual in its focus. So lacking are we in direct access to other people's minds as to permit the development of such exclusionary but logically unassailable philosophies as solipsism. In pre-historic times, however, consciousness may well have been what many myths imply: collective. Under conditions of shared awareness, secret thoughts would have been impossible and probably unwanted. Such collective consciousness would have gone far beyond Jung's collective unconscious, in that Jung's formulation presupposes repression, or the banishment of unaccepted thoughts into a realm of at least partial or temporary unawareness. Both Velikovsky and Reich acknowledged the likelihood that the tradition of a Golden Age preceding the inhumanities recorded by historians reflected a prehistoric reality rather than a wishful fantasy. But only Reich took the further step of specifying physical as well as psychological dissociations resulting from the Time of Troubles inferred to have separated the Golden Age from the historic era. Among these dissociations was the bioenergetic separation of intellectual function, centered in the head, and of libidinal function, centered in the genitals, from the holosomatic function of the rest of the body, involving manipulation, locomotion, and nutrition. Further exploration of global mythology additionally suggests that the internal fragmentation of individual function that takes the form of neurosis and "conversion symptoms" (organic malfunction) is parellelled and potentiated by an internal fragmentation of collective function which previously split a harmonious humanity into disconnected and often mutually destructive communities and then split the communities into equally disconnected and antagonistic individuals. AQUATICISM AND QUANTALISM Aquaticism, better known as "the Aquatic Ape Theory," is the hypothesis that, between the Miocene Epoch, when our ancestors probably lived in trees, and the Pleistocene Epoch, when they almost certainly lived in grasslands, they may well have lived, at least part of the time, in shallow water. Although the hypothesis was first advanced by Sir Alister Hardy, Lineacre Professor of Zoology at Oxford University, it has been most widely popularized by science writer Elaine Morgan of Wales. Aquaticism is so divergent from the consensual view of human evolution that most anthropologists have ignored it rather than bothering to attack it. Consensus aside, however, the evidence for ancestral hominids' having been at least semi-aquatic is strong. In terms of anatomy alone, we find that human physique resembles that of aquatic vertebrates generally far more than it does that of other primates or of most purely terrestrial mammals. A cursory overview of our anatomical peculiarities is indicative: human trait | aquatic species in which an analog occurs ----------------------------------------- - bipedal stance | penguin limb proportions | marine iguana smooth skin | porpoise bust | manatee foot shape | sea-lion brain size | dolphin subcutaneous fat | dugong jaw shape | frog While there is nothing catastrophic about a shift in habitat, there is something saltatory about it. And, while we remain genetically very close to our nearest phylogenetic kinsmen, the great apes, we are phenotypically very unlike them. The environmental zigzag evident in a hominid detour from Miocene forests through Pliocene waters to Pleistocene savannas exhibits striking evolutionary discontinuity. In this sense, the aquatic hypothesis is highly compatible with the theory of quantalism. PONTOPHILIA AND PONTOPHOBIA The terms "pontophilia" and "pontophobia" are neologisms. Based on common Classical Greek forms, the former word means "love of the sea" and the latter, "fear of the sea." The Greek noun póntos, "sea," is cognate with Latin pons (genitive pontis), "bridge," and Old Prussian pintis, "road." It referred primarily to those seas, like the Black Sea north of Anatolia, which frequently served as pathways to other lands. In practice, the word pontophilia has two distinct meanings, which, however, may overlap. The first is a more behavioral meaning: enjoyment of travel by sea. The second is a more theoretical meaning: belief that even the earliest human beings traveled by sea. Predictably, the word pontophobia has correspondingly overlapping meanings: aversion to travel by sea; and disbelief that prehistoric humanity took part in sea voyages. In each case, the behavioral orientation is likely to determine the theoretical orientation. Since few scholars are mariners, few scholars have accepted the likelihood-or even the possibility-that human transoceanic travel is ancient. But I see a direct link between early human aquaticism and early human transoceanism. The second, I think, follows expectably from the first. If our Pliocene ancestors were habitual swimmers, they probably enjoyed riding on logs and other floating debris, at first playfully and later purposefully. And it is unlikely, in my view, that their Pleistocene descendants developed an aversion to salt water which they subsequently overcame and reversed in the Holocene Epoch of recent millennia. It accords far better with the principle of intellectual parsimony, I should say, to assume that our hominid ancestors were always water-prone and that, as their tool-using proficiency increased, so did their ability to navigate broader watery expanses between lands. Catastrophists may object that our species has always been subject to global disasters and that these disasters must inevitably have made people profoundly fearful of natural trauma. Yet it may be that proto-hominids initially adopted an aquatic (or at least semi-aquatic) way of life because shallow water afforded them better protection from forest-fires and woodland predators than did an arboreal existence. If so, the predominantly smooth surface of open waters might well have appeared to them to be more inviting than the mountains, cliffs, and canyons produced by tectonic disruptions, which constituted relatively permanent barriers to easy migration. It must be reiterated that quantal events are not solely catastrophic in effect. If they were, the biosphere would long since have vanished. Quantal events are also saltatory. Saltatory events, in tern, are not restricted to such genetic occurrences as speciation. Many-perhaps most-of them are behavioral in nature, comprising new adaptations to changed circumstances. Our human adaptation to the waters of the world, unique in the primate order, is what enabled us, in prehistoric times, to occupy and exploit all of our planet's continents and most of its islands as well. Allan R. Bomhard and John C. Kerns, The Nostratic Macrofamily: A Study in Distant Linguistic Relationship, Mouton De Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1994 "Cenocatastrophism," a paper presented at the Kronia Communications' Symposium on Velikovsky, Portland, Oregon, November 1994 I here use the older spelling of the prepositive "ceno-" to indicate that it reflects Greek kaino-, "recent," rather than koino-, "common," or keno-, "empty". 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Wescott, "The Golden Age" (as in footnote 28) Wilhelm Reich, The Function of the Orgasm, Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, New York, 1948 Roger W. Wescott, ibid. Elaine Morgan, The Aquatic Ape, Stein and Day, New York, 1982 Roger W. Wescott, "The Paradoxical Primate," Kronos, winter 1984 Roger W. Wescott, "Types of Cultural Diffusion," The Journal of the New England Antiquities Research Association, forthcoming