"Extra-Scientific" Dimensions of Science DR ROBERT McAULAY Robert McAulay, Assistant Professor of Sociology at Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, New York, has taken a keen interest in the Velikovsky controversy. His other published work on the subject has appeared in THEORY AND SOCIETY and in ZETETIC SCHOLAR. Viewed in the wider social context, the conflict between Velikovsky's views and the scientific community can be seen to be symptomatic of long-standing opposition between competing world-views, with heavy religious overtones. IF THE CONTROVERSY which began with Worlds in Collision has spawned a wealth of publications dealing with various implications of IMMANUEL VELIKOVSKY'S work and with the merits of his catastrophism vis-à-vis prevailing scientific notions, there is as well a growing assortment of efforts which attempt to explain the social dynamics of that dispute. Articles by DE GRAZIA, POLANYI, MULKAY, DOLBY, STORER, MARTIN, and my own recent efforts all take steps in this direction [1]. Readers of SISR are likely to be particularly familiar with a number of the above which have been printed, reprinted, discussed or otherwise reviewed in these pages [2]. Whatever useful insights may emerge from these sometimes varied, sometimes overlapping accounts, the so-called Velikovsky "affair" cannot be adequately understood unless that case is placed in a larger socio-cultural context. This does not mean that substantive scientific considerations or that cognitive and technical dimensions of specialist-dominated science are without relevance to an understanding of the wholesale dismissal of Velikovsky's views by mainstream science. Nevertheless, we should not make the mistake of seeing the rejection of those ideas as only an "internal" or "strictly scientific" matter. Rather, what is being symbolically exorcised is an entire world view - one which, ironically, neither Velikovsky nor his most articulate supporters necessarily embrace. In this light, Uniformitarianism and Catastrophism should not be viewed simply as competing scientific theories, but rather as more sweeping perspectives with a host of "extra-scientific" implications [3]. Academic scientists, I would argue, tend to endorse one of these frameworks while almost reflexively rejecting anything which smacks of the other - including Velikovsky's thinking. Perhaps most conspicuous in this regard is an ingrained antipathy to theories which, rightly or wrongly, can be linked with a "fundamentalist" point of view. In short, I suggest that scientists may be viewed as the vanguard of an economically and politically interested professional class and, as such, often share a cohesive cosmology, metaphysics and even "religious" stance with which Velikovsky's ideas conflict. Three Explanatory Approaches In order to understand the characteristic limitations of most explanatory accounts of the Velikovsky "affair", it is useful to begin by outlining three standard sociological views of the scientific enterprise: 1) concern with the (moral) norms of science [4]; 2) a conception of scientific paradigms which focuses on the "group licensed way of seeing" and set of commitments engendered by a single, shared theoretical perspective [5]; and 3) an approach which, without necessarily impugning the validity of scientific beliefs, stresses their ideological or extra-scientific features [6]. These three lines of thinking, however, are rarely distinct in practice and frequently overlap and co-exist in various combinations. It is the second and third of these which appear to offer the most workable views of the Velikovsky controversy, although proponents of the second often under-emphasise the extra-scientific dimensions of the paradigms with which they deal. On the other hand, it is quite possible to take an "ideological" approach to an extreme which reduces science to merely another mythology. Whatever the case, these three perspectives provide conceptual resources which can be drawn upon to highlight various facets of the dispute over Velikovsky's work. In this particular instance, the "normative" approach is best exemplified by NORMAN STORER'S analysis delivered at the 1974 AAAS symposium on Velikovsky and included in Scientists Confront Velikovsky. It is Storer's account which most self-consciously draws on a traditional Mertonian approach to the sociology of science, although one may see elements of the concern with ethical norms in Alfred de Grazia's analysis as well as in Dolby's account. Generally speaking, a normative perspective views scientific practice as guided by a set of ethical conventions which facilitate the "rational" adoption or rejection of theories on the basis of their logical and empirical strengths. The moral norms of science allegedly constrain scientists to act in a manner which ensures that ideas are shared with other scientists through publication ("communality") and can thereby be subject to critical scrutiny ("organised scepticism"). This process, in principle, operates on the basis of impersonal criteria, without regard to the person who advances those ideas ("universality"), and with the interest of scientific knowledge, rather than financial or other gain, as the paramount end in view ("disinterestedness"). These are, however, ideal standards which are subject to inherent strains. Given certain built-in tensions and scientists' concern with individual recognition, these norms may, in any particular case, be only more or less operative [7]. The problems with this perspective in accounting for the dynamics of Velikovsky's case are manifest. So seemingly inappropriate is this or the related "Rationalistic" model of science in characterising the dispute that de Grazia is led to offer alternative models which stress the "indeterminacy" of what passes for scientific knowledge as well as the power-related and "dogmatic" aspects of science. Even Storer, who begins with this conceptual framework, emphasises that the norms of science apply primarily to individuals within the confines of the scientific community and may not be seen by scientists as applicable to "outsiders" such as Velikovsky [7a]. In partial contrast, R. G. A. Dolby's analysis of the rejection of Velikovsky's ideas raises the question of "specialist" science and stresses, in particular, the styles and conventions to which those who seek recognition of their ideas must conform in order for their theories to be regarded as "serious" scientific contenders. Dolby's work builds on the premise that scientific knowledge is paradigm-based and, although he discusses standards not unlike "communality" and "organised scepticism", would nonetheless tie these norms of science to specific paradigms. Hence, as he argues elsewhere: "Within the paradigm notion ... one is able to delineate a pattern of scepticism - where scepticism increases as material conforms less to the expectations provided by a paradigm." [8] In a related vein, M. J. Mulkay's "Some Aspects of Cultural Growth in the Natural Sciences" places explicit emphasis on the notion that paradigms (or in his preferred terms "cognitive and technical norms") take precedence over the ethical canons of science [9]. Especially when novel problems or unorthodox methods are involved - as in the case of Velikovsky - individuals are likely to have their work rejected or dismissed by scientists. Thus for both Dolby and Mulkay "paradigms" engender a set of accepted ways of viewing and answering questions. In what may only be a difference of emphasis, Dolby appears to link the norms of science to particular paradigms, while Mulkay suggests that the ethical norms of science (if they can be said to be operative at all) simply take a back seat in the face of strong commitment to a given set of paradigm-based cognitive and technical norms. Finally, Michael Polanyi's seminal work - especially as presented in Personal Knowledge - bears on the implicit commitments which underlie scientific "paradigms", although he does not employ that particular term. Polanyi focuses instead on the tacit knowledge of a field which, over and beyond articulate notions, imparts a sense of what is and is not worthy of scientific consideration. In his treatment of the case of Velikovsky (as found in his article "The Growth of Science in Society"), he argues that, for reasons which cannot be fully put into words, Worlds in Collision was considered implausible, even absurd, and that further consideration of those ideas was perceived as a waste of time. For the most part, however, all of the above accounts share the limitation of confining discussion to matters largely "internal" to science. There is some suggestion that, as an outsider, Velikovsky was perceived as someone whose ideas could be more easily dismissed as that of a "crank". Often implicit here is the idea that Velikovsky lacks a subtle knowledge of the "intimate structure of science" [10] and hence, does not present and argue his ideas along conventionally acknowledged lines. In addition, there are grounds for arguing that Velikovsky's approach so conflicts with reigning theories and methods that his work has been simply dismissed out of hand. Without denying the importance of all of this, it is nonetheless possible to see such explanations as incomplete in so far as they fail to link Velikovsky's heterodox theories to a larger world view or perspective at odds with that characterising modern science. A partial exception in this regard is Brian Martin's article, "The Determinants of Scientific Behaviour", which stresses the vested interests of scientists as well as the potential relevance of such disputes to outside interests. Thus, in the case of Velikovsky (as in analogous instances), scientists stand shoulder to shoulder vis-à-vis a lay public whose approach to science and general lack of technical knowledge is viewed as a threat to scientific expertise. In this vein, I would add that we need to take into account the perceived lack of "fit" between catastrophism and the needs of modern industrial society as well as the interests of scientists in their own role as advisers to government and industry. In both respects a "uniformitarian" view of the world as orderly, subject to relatively predictable transformations and as amendable within limits to rational control, is particularly integral [11]. We need, nonetheless, to supplement these considerations by reference to additional cultural currents in light of which the emotionally charged opposition to Velikovsky can be further comprehended. Of special significance is the fact that Velikovsky's catastrophism is seen by a number of eminent scientists as raising once more the spectre of the arch-nemesis of modern science - Christian fundamentalism. Linking Velikovsky's Catastrophism to Fundamentalism In large measure, coming to grips with the dispute over Velikovsky's thinking requires seeing the clash of his ideas with both an articulated and unarticulated edifice of "scientific" beliefs. In particular, Velikovsky's work has brought forth a host of gratuitous associations in the minds of scientists - connotations which reinforce, if they do not at times supersede, the substantive objections to his work. Perhaps the key factor is that Velikovsky's theories are regularly linked with literal interpretations of the Bible, and are thus viewed as being of one piece with "fundamentalism", rather than as an historical use of the Bible and other sources [12]. Along these lines, the number of times that scientists refer to the religious implications of Velikovsky's work is striking [13]. Such remarks might be seen as peripheral to rejection of Velikovsky's ideas were they not systematically related to the background of Western science. In the first instance, the close connection between the growth of modern science and certain religious commitments has been the topic of several important studies which suggest an association between scientific activity and progressive religious beliefs. In the first half of the twentieth century (where religious affiliation has been salient) it appears to have been either Jewish or liberal Protestant faiths that have been disproportionately linked with scientific productivity to the exclusion of traditional or fundamentalist beliefs [14]. Secondly, science has often been at odds with religious fundamentalism and catastrophic theories. There is, in this vein, a long-standing history - from disputes over uniformitarian geology to DARWIN'S theory of evolution - in which forerunners of the present debate can be seen. As I have elsewhere argued: "If in the past traditional religious sentiments have spurred resistance to Copernican and Darwinian theories, the Velikovsky 'affair' conversely, marks the resistance of establishment science to a cosmology charged with fundamentalist religious significance." [15]. As a further extension of the above, take the ties of HARLOW SHAPLEY, KIRTLEY MATHER, and WARREN WEAVER - all linked with opposition to Velikovsky - to "free-thinking" religious organisations. Shapley's association with The Institute of Religion in an Age of Science (IRAS) and the Star Island group was capped by his membership on the editorial advisory board of Zygon ("Journal of Religion and Science") on which Mather also served and in which Shapley, Mather and Weaver published essays. Zygon is explicitly associated with the project of "reformulating religion for an age of science" and is outspokenly associated with opposition to literal biblical exegesis and religious fundamentalism [16]. From that journal's point of view fundamentalism is seen as a set of beliefs formulated in a pre-industrial, prescientific age, and as no longer suitable to the needs of modern scientific-industrial societies. Reading the non-scientific work of Shapley, Mather, and selected portions of Zygon suggests the rudiments of a "modern" world view or cosmology explicitly juxtaposed to a catastrophic-fundamentalist one. In this light, it is hardly coincidence that Velikovsky's major antagonist, Harlow Shapley, was committed to a point of view in direct contrast to the fundamentalist perspective with which Velikovsky's work is so often linked in the minds of scientists. It is, consequently, reasonable to suggest that this "religious" dimension is one important source of the emotional reaction to Velikovsky's work and a further support for the sense of implausibility which Velikovsky's catastrophism seems to have almost reflexively inspired. An important document in this vein is Kirtley Mather's article, "The Administration of the Universe", in which uniformitarianism is explicitly linked with "law and order" vis-à-vis catastrophism as the very embodiment of the "chaos and confusion" anathema to modern science [17]. Yet it is still possible to come across related remarks which view fundamentalism as well as other forms of popular "irrationalism" as the twin pillars of support for Velikovsky. Witness, for example, recent statements by MARTIN GARDNER in his review of CARL SAGAN's latest book, Broca's Brain: "At the moment our country is experiencing two major paradoxical trends. "One is a by-product of the new wave of Protestant fundamentalism ... Galloping alongside the fundamentalist awakening is the "occult explosion" - the public's obsession with astrology, pseudoscience, and all things paranormal ... Few scientists care to speak out on either trend and it is not hard to understand why. "Consider the curious case of Immanuel Velikovsky whose books are closely linked to the fundamentalist revival. A devout believer in orthodox Judaism, Dr Velikovsky (he was trained in psychoanalysis) set himself the task of revising the laws of astronomy and physics, and rewriting vast globs of ancient history to spin an incredible tale about the planet Venus that would "explain" the major miracles of the Old Testament. MacMillan's lavish advertising for Velikovsky's first book, Worlds in Collision, made no secret of how the book supported the historicity of Old Testament miracles. There is no question that the book would never have become a bestseller, had it not had a strong appeal to old-time religionists." [18] This is, I suggest, no mere idiosyncratic diatribe - although it may be an especially clear example of the underlying sentiments I am trying to illustrate. It provides but one additional indication of the metaphysical iceberg with which Velikovsky's catastrophism has come into conflict. In this light, even if the rejection of Velikovsky's theories were to prove correct (and I do not claim to be able to judge the outcome one way or the other), that fact would not diminish the deep-seated opposition between two competing world views - a conflict which most certainly can be traced at least to the beginning of the Nineteenth century and evidence of which can be found to this day in the Creationist opposition to Darwin and neo-Darwinian theories of evolution. While the social sources of support for Velikovsky's catastrophism are not particularly clear cut, the scientific perception of fundamentalist beliefs as the well-spring of that support is very much in evidence. Avoiding Reductionism and Specifying Mechanisms A crucial caveat in light of the preceding argument is that we should not simply espouse an interpretation here which reduces the dispute over Velikovsky's ideas to an "ideological" conflict. The controversy is, in fact, notable for the confluence of several currents which the various accounts outlined earlier at least partially illuminate. While I find Polanyi's concern with the tacit dimension of science appealing, he simply fails to consider other than internal scientific sources of the felt "absurdity" of Velikovsky's ideas. While Dolby's concern with specialist science or Mulkay's argument that paradigms take precedence over ethical norms provide useful insights, they too neglect the possibility that certain paradigms are reinforced by potent political, philosophical or religious forces. If commitment to theories and the cognitive/technical conventions associated with them can stir strong sentiments, commitment to theories which resonate with collective interests, beliefs and symbols can inspire even greater emotional support. Finally, it is not simply that paradigms may take precedence over the moral norms of science, but that when the collective rather than individual interests of scientists are at stake the ethical conventions of science may be particularly expendable: "While the institutionalised norm of "disinterestedness" may serve to channel or check individual motivations for recognition and personal gain, can that norm as effectively police the institutionalised interestedness of contemporary science? If "uniformity" is interwoven with a scientific world view congenial to the interests of scientists in securing continued funding and a role in the planning of advanced industrial society, should we expect a disinterested appraisal of catastrophism? If in the past recruitment to science has been associated disproportionately with liberal religious affiliation or if secular-agnostic beliefs are prevalent among scientists, should we anticipate an unbiased hearing for theories which resonate with Christian fundamentalism?" [19] It is vital, nonetheless, not to rest the above case on the argument that professional, political, or "religious" interests are symbolically "superimposed" on the dispute between individuals adhering to divergent scientific perspectives. Rather, we must in addition attempt to specify certain of the mechanisms whereby "extra-scientific" interests, sentiments, and beliefs can influence or distort the allegedly objective test and appraisal of ideas. Why is it, in other words, that we cannot simply compare theories and empirical reality, adopting that theory which best fits with the empirical world? The issues here are complex but answers to questions like this are bound up with the fact that scientific theories almost always confront apparent counter-evidence - some of which may pose "real" difficulties, some eventually traceable to inadequate, misleading or erroneous results. It is, moreover, exceedingly difficult to tell precisely when modification or extension of an existing theory will prove viable, just as it is impossible to predict with unequivocal certainty which empirical findings will ultimately prove trustworthy. I would stress, in addition, that the choice between competing scientific perspectives always entails a value judgement as to which competing theory fits the evidence and holds the most promise as a guide to future research. There are, however, no clear cut rules which specify when the perceived strengths of one theory outweigh the alleged faults of another. Such judgements would be difficult enough if only "scientific" or technical considerations were at stake, in part because proponents of competing theories might challenge discomforting evidence or make modifications to their theories in order to correct for unexpected empirical results. But the incentive to impugn certain experimental findings or to make alterations to theories (not to mention the weight given to one perspective vis-à-vis another) is especially great when those scientific perspectives have auxiliary religious, political or other "extraneous" implications. The Copernican Revolution, the debate over Darwin's theory of evolution, and the Velikovsky controversy all entail such extra-scientific ramifications - dimensions which must be taken into account when considering the dynamics of each [20]. In fact, a careful scrutiny of the arguments over Velikovsky's thinking often reveals - on both sides - instances of possible theoretical modification and challenges to potential counter-evidence. For example, one might well consider Carl Sagan's revival of the "greenhouse effect' (or some similar mechanism) as an ad hoc adjustment advanced in order to account for the potentially "falsifying" evidence represented by Venus' unexpectedly high surface temperature. The problem is that such an alteration might be seen to constitute a "reasonable" effort to modify an otherwise adequate theory while - with the benefit of hindsight - it might also be viewed as the last-ditch attempt to salvage a doomed theory. Velikovsky supporters may see Sagan's efforts as egregiously ad hoc. But are such efforts likely to be found only on the side of establishment science in mounting rebuttal to Velikovsky's claims? I think not. Suppose, for instance, that the thesis of hydrocarbons in Venus' atmosphere were to prove insupportable as initially advanced - would that be sufficient grounds for dismissing the entire fabric of Velikovsky's thinking or for abandoning a catastrophic perspective? The answer depends in good measure on how one weighs the coherence and other strengths of Velikovsky's work. It seems to me, however, that EUAN MACKIE's idea of Velikovsky's "two, possibly three, General theories and a large number of specific theories stemming from them" plus the suggestion that "some of the specific theories could be drastically modified, or even disproved, without affecting the general theories" leaves the door open for similar ad hoc amendment. As MALCOLM LOWERY suggests with reference to the above: "This ... is a position which it is only reasonable to take: not every principle of present-day knowledge is to be thrown overboard; and no more should any one innovator expect every detail of even the most inevitable breakthrough to vindicate itself without amendment." [21] In addition to such modification, it is (in principle) always possible to question the adequacy of experimental evidence. Given that empirical findings are contingent upon the instrumentation, experimental design, and various assumptions whereby they are produced, the challenge to certain empirical results is an important aspect of scientific debates. In this respect one need go no further than Velikovsky's own response to W. T. PLUMMER's article which purported to offer evidence falsifying the notion of hydrocarbons in Venus' atmosphere, or Velikovsky's criticisms of radiocarbon dating. In the first case, Velikovsky pointed to the fact that Plummer's alleged test for hydrocarbons was inconclusive because Plummer had made certain incorrect assumptions concerning Velikovsky's original statements [22]. In the second instance mentioned above, Velikovsky argued that radiocarbon dating was based on the uniformitarian premise that the influx of cosmic rays had not been subject to substantial variation over the past 50,000 years. Such an influx would throw off the absolute dating of materials which allegedly supported the conventional Egyptian chronology [23]. Velikovsky's adversaries have taken a parallel tack in questioning the relation between his "theories" and the advance forecasts which many view as supporting his claims. Hence, MORRISON has questioned the fit between Velikovsky's prediction of the earth's magnetosphere and the subsequent discovery of the Van Allen Belts [24]. Similarly he has challenged the relation between Velikovsky's work and the forecast of radio-noise from Jupiter [25]. The general line of attack, here as elsewhere, has been to suggest that the connection between Velikovsky's theories and subsequent findings is neither obvious nor sufficiently quantitative to count as empirical substantiation. Again, I would argue that the incentive for such manoeuvres is at least partially propelled by the extra-scientific significance of both uniformitarian and catastrophic approaches. Similar moves, however, are likely to be characteristic of any paradigm dispute - even those which appear to involve "strictly internal" or technical considerations - and cannot be immediately judged as "legitimate" or "illegitimate". To reiterate, such thrusts and parrying are likely to be especially in evidence when dealing with reasonably complex theories that have either manifest or latent "ideological" ramifications. Some Concluding Remarks It is not my intention to argue here either the correctness or incorrectness of Velikovsky's work, nor do I want to be understood as dismissing the importance of empirical considerations in resolving that dispute. Nonetheless, accounts of the controversy which look only at normative or paradigmatic dimensions, as well as those who place primacy on narrowly empirical versions of science, have likely over-looked important features of the dispute [26]. The Velikovsky controversy cannot easily be truncated from the vested interests of scientists, their backgrounds, deepseated beliefs, nor from the general socio-cultural surround. With respect to empirical matters, one cannot fully separate the viewing and weighing of evidence from the intertwining of both scientific and "extra-scientific" concerns. Even if individuals agree on facts such as Venus' surface temperature, the question of what that evidence means remains. Is Venus' surface temperature an unexpected finding which can be adjusted for, allowing the retention of accepted theories, a continued faith in the structure of specialist science and scientists' judgement, as well as (for some) the notion of uniformitarian-like harmony in the administration of the cosmos? Or does that surface temperature thoroughly conflict with prevailing theories and indicate a relatively recent origin for Venus - a fact which would call into question the conventional wisdom of scientists, threaten their privileged status, as well as supporting a catastrophic perspective which, for many scientists, conjures up visions of the very fundamentalism which has historically impeded scientific advance? However one weighs the choice posed by this somewhat overstated dichotomy, the issues are not just "scientific" nor has the battle been fought only in the name of Science. Notes and References 1. Alfred de Grazia, "The Scientific Reception System", in de Grazia et al.: The Velikovsky Affair (University Books, 1966; Abacus, 1979). Michael Polanyi: "The Growth of Science in Society", Minerva 5 (1967), pp. 533-45. M. J. Mulkay: "Some Aspects of Cultural Growth in the Natural Sciences", Social Research 36 (1969), pp. 32-52. R. G. A. Dolby: "What Can We Usefully Learn from the Velikovsky Affair", Social Studies of Science, 5 (1975), pp. 165-75. Norman W. Storer: "The Sociological Context of the Velikovsky Controversy", in Donald Goldsmith (ed.): Scientists Confront Velikovsky (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977). Brian Martin: "The Determinants of Scientific Behaviour", SISR II:4 (1978), pp. 112-8. Robert McAulay: "Velikovsky and the Infrastructure of Science", Theory and Society 6 (1978), pp. 313-342. 2. See for example, Leroy Ellenberger: "A Point of view", SISR 3 (1978), pp. 29-31; Brian Moore, "Bookshelf", SISR 1 (1976), p. 24; R. G. A. Dolby's article reprinted as "On Schools of Thought", SISR 1 (1976). 26-31; Martin, op. cit. Also relevant in this vein is Hugo Meynell's response to Dolby, "On Schools of Thought - A Reply", SISR I:4 (1976), pp. 5-8. Meynell's point of view is noteworthy but somewhat beyond the scope of the present paper, which deals more directly with "sociological" accounts of the Velikovsky controversy. While I have indicated certain of my disagreements with Meynell in footnote 26, adequate consideration of his arguments would require an article in itself. 3. The distinction between "scientific" and "extra-scientific" is by no means necessarily clear cut or apparent. Here "extra-scientific' is intended to convey the notion of what is normally regarded as being "outside" or "in addition to" those practices bearing on the logical and empirical assessment of theories. All of this is, of course, akin to and embodies certain of the complexities of the debate over "internal" and "external" approaches to the history of science. 4. In particular, Robert K. Merton: "The Normative Structure of Science", in The Sociology of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 267-78. This article has appeared elsewhere under different titles. 5. Thomas S. Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). See also the two essays by Kuhn in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.): Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 1970). 6. This approach grows out of a Marxian tradition and, in some sense, extends a sociology of knowledge approach (e.g. Karl Mannheim: Ideology and Utopia) to natural science. For a relatively sophisticated discussion of these matters see Barry Barnes: Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974). especially Chapter 6. Also McAulay, pp. 313-15. 7. Merton discusses the tensions between individual recognition and disinterestedness in "The Ambivalence of Scientists", The Sociology of Science, pp. 383-412. For an excellent critical discussion of Mertonian norms see M. J. Mulkay: "Norms and Ideology in Science", Soc. Sci. Inform. (1976), pp. 637-56. Also S. B. Barnes and R. G. A. Dolby: "The Scientific Ethos: A Deviant Viewpoint", European Journal of Sociology 2 (1970). pp. 3-25. 7a. Storer also suggests, following de Grazia and Stecchini, that McCarthy's politically motivated attack in the early 1950's, upon supposedly left-leaning members of the scientific community, may have exacerbated the response to Velikovsky. This notion can best be appreciated, I think, if it is linked to perceived sources of support for Velikovsky - i.e., a popular, socially marginal, perhaps fundamentalist or traditionally religious following - a matter dealt with in further detail later on in this paper. 8. Barnes and Dolby, p. 11. 9. As an important supplement to Mulkay's argument with respect to Velikovsky see his The Social Process of Innovation (London: MacMillan, 1972), e.g. p. 33. 10. The phrase is Asimov's in the foreword to Scientists Confront Velikovsky, but nonetheless catches something of what Dolby suggests. 11. McAulay, pp. 323-27 and 331-34. 12. Joseph May makes a similar distinction in his article "The Heresy of a New Synthesis", Zetetic Scholar 3-4 (1979). 13. E.g., Carl Sagan: The Cosmic Connection (New York, 1973), p. 92; Otto Struve as reported by Livio Stecchini in de Grazia et al., p. 120. 14. Kenneth R. Hardy: "Social Origins of American Scientists and Scholars", Science 9 August 1974. 15. McAulay. p. 315. 16. "Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science" - Zygon Vol. 1, No. 1 (1966). pp. 1-7; also in the same issue, "Some Roots of Zygon", pp. 117-19. 17. Kirtley F. Mather, Zygon 3 (1968), pp. 59-71. While Mather suggests that the orderly (uniformitarian) administration of the universe is a akin to the Theologian's "God of Law", the full religious significance of Mather's uniformitarianism can perhaps better be assessed by reference to his earlier work, Science in Search of God (New York, 1928), in which he writes: "The attributes of the universe, so far as known to us, are such as to make obvious and necessary the conclusion that this administration is orderly.... God is a God of Law, therefore trustworthy, therefore congenial to the scientific mind." (pp. 106-7) For further discussion of this see McAulay, op. cit., pp. 330-1. 18. M. Gardner, New York Review of Books, June 14, 1979, pp. 32-33. 19. McAulay, pp. 335-6. 20. Thomas Kuhn (following in some measure E. A. Burtt and Alexandre Koyre) does this with respect to the Neo-Platonic background of the dispute over sun-centred astronomy. See The Copernican Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956). With respect to Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection the work of Robert M. Young is most informative. See "Malthus and the Evolutionists: The Common Context of Biological and Social Theory", Past & Present No. 43 (1969), pp. 109-45 and " 'Non-Scientific' factors in the Darwinian Debate", Actes du XII Congrès International D'Histoire des Sciences (Paris, Blanchard, 1971), Vol. 8 pp. 221-6. 21. In comments on Joseph May's "The Heresy of a New Synthesis", Zetetic Scholar 3-4 (1979), p. 60. As Lowery points out, MacKie's remarks in "A Quantitive Test for Catastrophic Theory", Pensée IVR III, 6-9, did not meet with universal approval among Velikovsky supporters. 22. "Plummer's verdict is not conclusive ... it is based on three incorrect assumptions: a) that I stipulated that hydrocarbons are present in condensed form (producing a reflection spectrum); b) that I located them in the upper (reflecting) layer of the clouds and c) following from Plummer's comparison that I maintained that they are the sole constituent of the clouds. In my original statement however I made it clear that polymerised and therefore heavy molecules of petroleum hydrocarbons are not necessarily present in the upper layer of the dense atmosphere; that in the lower levels, because of the heat they must circulate in gaseous form; and that they are not the only components of the clouds." - "Venus and Hydrocarbons", Pensée IVR VI, pp. 32-4. 23. "The Pitfalls of Radio-Carbon Dating", Pensée IVR IV, especially pp. 12-13. 24. "Planetary Astronomy and Velikovsky's Catastrophism", in Goldsmith, pp. 150-1, 25. ibid., p, 152. 26. It may be useful to contrast what I have said in the preceding section with Hugo Meynell's reply to Dolby in SISR I:4 and also with certain remarks in "A Philosophy for Interdisciplinary Studies", SISR III:1 (1978), relevant to the above discussion. Not only do I disagree strongly with Meynell's view of Thomas Kuhn's work but see in his remarks a stance which tends to occlude precisely the "extra-scientific" dimension of the Velikovsky controversy that I am focusing upon. See also Hugo Meynell: "On the Limits of the Sociology of Knowledge", Social Studies of Science 7, No. 4 (1977), pp. 489-500. Again, however, my points of agreement and disagreement would take considerable space and time to sort out; thus I have not specifically tackled those issues here. _________________________________________________________________ \cdrom\pubs\journals\review\v0402to3\54extra.htm